A programme to bring AI into Back Market's seller platform. Started with FAQ automation, built to ML-driven pricing tools. The one time we skipped the trust sequence, it showed.
1,700+ professional sellers pricing blind. No visibility into competitor activity, demand signals, or sales velocity. 65% reported struggling to find the right price.
Led the design of five AI features from low-risk FAQ automation through to ML-driven pricing tools.
Deliberate escalation. Each feature earned the trust required for the next. The one feature that skipped the sequence caused the programme's most significant trust failure.
Back Market is Europe's largest marketplace for refurbished electronics, powered by 1,700+ professional resellers across Europe and North America. These aren't casual listers — they're businesses managing thousands of listings, repricing daily, and processing high volumes of orders. Their primary tool is the Seller Back Office: a web platform for pricing, inventory, orders, logistics, and performance analytics. It's open every working day.
Sellers price using a mental formula: sourcing cost + operating costs + return risk + target margin. The problem is that several variables determining whether that price is competitive were either unavailable or required guesswork:
If I lower my price by €10, how much more market share can I gain? Sellers had no way to answer this — they experimented manually and observed what happened.
How many other sellers am I competing against on this specific product? Are they better priced than me? This data existed inside Back Market — it just wasn't surfaced to sellers.
Will this stock sell in a week or sit for two months? Without a forecast, sellers couldn't connect pricing decisions to cash flow — especially for stock they'd already bought.
Sellers think in absolute margin per unit (€ in, € out) — not in commission percentages. Converting a Back Market commission rate into actual earnings required manual calculation for every product.
Back Market already had the data to answer these questions. The problem wasn't a data gap. It was a product gap: the intelligence existed but none of it was reaching sellers in a form they could act on.
I mapped the decisions sellers make daily, the information each required, and what Back Market could credibly provide. For each opportunity, the same question emerged: should we show the intelligence and let sellers act, or should the system act on their behalf? It turned out to be the most consequential design decision in the programme.
The stakes were unusually high. Back Market charges the highest commission rates in the market, and sellers assume the platform defaults to the customer. Any AI acting without explicit consent would be interpreted as the platform acting in its own interest.
To navigate this, I proposed a four-level spectrum — from passive data surfacing to full automation — and mapped every AI feature onto it. The spectrum became the governing framework for the entire programme: a feature can only occupy a level of automation proportionate to the trust the programme has earned with the audience it's serving.
Make the invisible visible. No recommendation. No action. Just information the seller didn't have before — competitor pricing, sales velocity, demand trends.
AI suggests, seller decides. No automation. Anchored to a concrete outcome forecast — not "our model suggests €X" but "at €X, we estimate 12–18 sales in 7 days."
Seller configures the rules explicitly — floor, ceiling, window. System acts within those bounds. The automation is sanctioned, which is why it works.
System acts without per-feature seller configuration. Only appropriate with a long, proven track record — and explicit opt-in, never opt-out.
SMP went through three major versions. Each iteration moved the framing further from the algorithm and closer to the seller's mental model.
AI currently surfaces across five distinct locations in the Back Office. Each was designed independently, but the programme is moving toward a coherent architecture where intelligence is present throughout the seller workflow.
Every feature required close collaboration with Back Market's data science team. The hardest negotiation was the cold-start problem: I pushed for a minimum 90-day accuracy window before surfacing track record data in the UI. The ML team resisted because it delayed a key engagement metric. We compromised on surfacing provisional accuracy earlier with explicit "early data" labelling. It was the right call. Showing unqualified numbers early would have undermined the trust the programme was built on.
Research surfaced four trust requirements. Each one shaped specific design decisions across the product.
Not a preference — a prerequisite. Sellers who discovered automation through its consequences (orders at prices they didn't set) stopped trusting every AI feature on the platform. DPU proved that no amount of good design recovers from a consent violation.
Every AI initiative in 2024 had pressure behind it — pressure to ship features with "AI" in the name, show progress to the board, keep pace with competitors. We pushed back on that. The question was never how do we add AI to the Back Office — it was where does AI actually make a seller's job easier, and how do we earn the right to put it there? That framing shaped every decision in this programme. The data below shows where it worked and where we still fell short.
The consistent finding: sellers express a coherent form of partial trust — they'll take the data, but not the recommendation. They're not disengaged; they're careful. The programme's job isn't to replace seller judgment — it's to give sellers the information to exercise it more confidently.
These findings pointed to a single conclusion: sellers didn't reject AI — they rejected AI that hadn't earned their trust yet. The order we introduced features mattered as much as the features themselves.
The accountability we wanted required getting the order right. Each feature either builds credibility or creates suspicion that every subsequent feature inherits. Shipping AI that works isn't a technology problem — it's a planning problem.
If we were starting again — with the luxury of sequencing the programme around trust instead of around shipping deadlines — we'd move through four stages:
The actual programme deviated under shipping pressure. BackPricer launched with a limited SMP track record. Dynamic Pricing Up went to Level 4 before the programme had earned it — exactly the kind of "ship AI because we can" decision we'd set out to avoid. The trust damage cast doubt on every subsequent AI feature.
This is Phase 1 of a multi-year programme. The roadmap operates across three horizons: